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I Introduction 
When an old economic theory is powerful, it survives so long enough until to be 
forgotten by everybody even if it has lost the reality. Therefore, economists who want to 
present a new theory, have to make every effort to test the validity of the old theory. 
However, it is not often the case that some old theories are rejected by econometric 
analysis. Even if an old theory is rejected by an econometric analysis, another data or 
another econometric technique often justifies it. 
Even worse, it is often the case that during the controversy on the plausibility of two 
alternative theories, the old theory gradually changes itself slightly. And researchers forget 
what an original theoretical model aimed to analyze. 
The controversies on the physician-induced demand theory and the competitive market 
theory about the determination of the health care costs appear to have such a history. 
As Reinhardt [1978] pointed out, it is not easy to induce the validity of these two alterna-
tive hypotheses. Since the competitive market theory does not appeal intuitively, some 
researchers have been trying to change the formulation of the model. 
At the present state, these modifications of the original model seem to stem from 
researchers' ideology, or at least from researchers' views of the world. The point of the 
controversy is whether patients/consumers can judge the quality of the health services. 
Though, intuitively, it appears that it is not easy for patients/consumers to judge the 
quality of them, some researches show us that, at least, in the primary health care market, 
they have significant power on the determination of the physicians' fee. People who are 
on the side of the competitive approach have their own ideology, that is, patients/consumers 
should have enough knowledge to choose much competitive physicians. 
As far as the ideology is concerned, I consent to this ideology. And I am sure that 
recent development of the research on the medical technology assessment and on the 
medical decision making will highly effective on making patients/consumers choose alter-
native kinds of health care. However, as will be shown later in section III, system of the 
Japanese health care is far from the situation which patients/consumers choose among 
alternative kinds of health care. 
In this paper, I try to show two results. First, it is shown that physician induced 
demand hypothesis is more plausible in Japan. Though it is not easy in the United States 
to reject the competitive market hypothesis, in Japan, like other Western countires, it 
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seems to be quite easy to show the plausibility of physician-induced nature of the health
care costs.
When we compare the situation in the Western nations and in Japan with that of
the United States, it is evident that the amount of copayment by the patient relative to
the total cost is significantly higher in the United States than in Western nations and
Japan. If the amount of copayment is quite significant, competitive market approach
may possibly be effective. Slight changes of the amount of copayment
, however, will not
make patient to be cost-conscious for the health care.
My second purpose in this paper is to investigate the effect of the copayment on the
increase of the total health care costs. In recent years
, in Japan, policy makers seem to
have such an ideology that patient/consumer should be more cost-conscious about the
choice of physicians. And they, by referring to competitive theories of health care costs
,
tried to show that the increase of the amount of the copayment could control the increase
of the health care costs.
I will criticise these analyses and will show that these analyses are derived from the
econometric misspecification of the model.
II The Model
The model which is tested in this paper is quite simple. I will follow the model
which was shown in Reinhardt [1978] in order to clarify the difference between the
physician-induced hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis. I will summarize
this model in the following.
The competitive market hypothesis of physician behavior would have the physician 
maximize an objective function
U=U(Y,W), Uy•„0 Uw•ƒ0;[1]
subject to the demand constraint
W=R•Ef(P), fp•ƒ0[2]
and the definition of net income
Y=P•EW-C(W),[3]
where Y=the physician's net income per period
W=an index of the physician's rate of" output" per period
(however defined)
P=the average fee per unit of the output index
R=the population-physician ratio in the physician's market area
C(W) =A cost function representing the minimum practice cost
(excluding the value of the physician's own time) at alternative output 
rates (W).
By adding several assumptions which satisfy the second order conditions
, we can derive
following propositions. According to the competitive market hypothesis
, the average fee
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level (P) decreases as the physician-population ratio (1/R) increases, that is, dP/dR must 
be positive.1) Per capita utilization (f(P)) is predicted to increase as physician-population 
ratio (1/R) increases, according to the competitive approach. Another signs such as 
dW/dR and dY/dR cannot be determined a priori. 
Intuitively, these propositions can be explained as follows : when physician-population 
ratio increases, competitive pressure makes physicians to decrease the fee level, and it 
makes physicians to accept more patient visits. 
It seems that there is one difficulty in applying this hypothesis to the case of Japan. 
In Japan, most of providers are reimbursed by the compulsory insurance system which 
fixes the fee schedule. Fees are prefixed for each itemized diagnosis and treatment.2) 
However, if we understand the original meaning of the physician-induced hypothesis, 
it may be suitable to take cost per case as a proxy variable of the fee. This interpretation 
is taken also in the case of West Germany in Kraft and Schulenburg [1986]. In this 
case, f(P) can be understood as the number of case per population. 
The model described above can only test the qualitative nature of the alternative two 
hypotheses. Since I want also to know the quantitative nature of the relationship between 
the demand and the price, estimations are done more straightforwardly, that is, following 
lniear regressions are estimated. 
log p=a0+a1 log d+a2 log n +a, log b+a4 logv + ƒÃ. [4] 
Here variables denote 
p=cost per case 
d=physician-population ratio 
n=number of cases per population 
b=ratio of patient payment to total costs 
y=mean income of the population. 
III Characteristics of the Data 
The data were collected from the pooled data on National Health Insurance scheme, 
of which population covers about 55 per cent of the total population. Since 55 per cent 
seems to be unable to show the whole phenomenon of the Japanese health care, it is 
necessary to explain the characteristics of the Japanese compulsory health insurance system. 
All of the residents in Japan are covered by either one of severeal different health 
insurance schemes. However the difference exists only in the demand side of the health 
care. All patients, regardless with what they belong to any scheme, can freely choose the 
 1) See the technical appendix in Reinhardt [1978]. 
 2) Reimbursement system does not clearly devide the physician's fee and the hospital charge. For 
instance, the clinic and the hospital buy medicines directly. Though prescription fees for the 
medicines are set quite lower, the clinic and the hospital can earn profits by providing drugs to 
the patients. Profit margins for the drugs are about 20 to 50 per cent of the purchasing cost. 
Instead, fees for the surgical operations are set at the lower level than those in the United 
States.
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Fig. 1 Copayment Schedules under Different Health Insurance Schemes in Japan
clinic and the hospital. Only difference is the amount of insurance premium and the 
amount of the deductibles for the insurance. If we broadly classify several insurance 
schemes in two categories, those are one for the self-employed people and the other for 
the employed people and their family dependents. 
Since the copayment schedules for these two categories, which is shown in Fig. 1, are 
not significantly different, recent number of the patient per population is quite similar in 
each insurance scheme for each age group. Age distribution of the component of the 
population among different insurance schemes, however, is different. Therefore, quantitative 
results should not be interpreted as having macroeconomic implication. 
Though, however, it is not shown here, the same estimations in this paper for other 
insurance schemes were done. And the results are quite similar with the results shown in 
this paper. 
Pooling was done in a way to pool 47 prefectural data with annual data from 1974 
to 1983. Estimations were done for (1) five years from 1974 to 1978, (2) five years from 
1979 to 1983, and (3) ten years from 1974 to 1983. 
The reason why I devided the data into two periods is because there may be a 
significant structural change in the pattern of the demand for medical care. In order to 
know the structural change, it might be better to apply the Chow's test. However, here 
I estimated the data divided into two periods, because I wanted to characterize the diffe-
rence of the coefficients. 
White Papers on the Japanese Economy [1985] by Economic Planning Agency has 
tried to inquire the causes of the recent rising health care costs. In the study, it used 
the longer time series data for the econometric study on the determination of health care 
costs. It, however, did not check whether there is the structural change. Several studies
A TEST OF THE PHYSICIAN-INDUCED EMAND HYPOTHESIS IN JAPAN 33 
has shown that the main causes of the increasing health care costs in Japan has changed 
around the years 1979-80 from the increase of the number of patients to the technological 
progress in the health care fields. 
As a matter of fact, the rate of the increase of the number of patients has significantly 
lowered since 1979. Therefore, we should be more careful in analyzing the relevant time 
data on the determination of health care costs. 
The average population of 47 prefectures is about 2 million. Since recent studies on 
the regional variation of medical practices are done in smaller areas, aggregated data such 
as at the prefectural level are not comparable with those studies. Though I realize that 
more subdivided data should be relevant to these studies, I could not use such kinds of 
data. One main reason is that in more subdivided data there are so many spill overs 
of patients from one region to another region. 
In my study, rate of the spill over from one prefecture to another prefecture is 18 
per cent at the maximum value. Moreover, I obtained the almost same results with the 
following equations by excluding 4 or 5 prefectures where significant spill over occured. 
IV Empirical Results 
When we estimate the pooled time series data, it is often the case that there exist 
serial correlations in the disturbance term. Therefore, I will estimate the equation [4] in 
Table 1(a), (b), and (c). Here equation [4] is












This is the same procedure shown in Pindyck and Rubinfeld [1981, 2nd edition. chap. 9.] 
These results are shown in Table 2 (a), (b), and (c). 
Before interpreting the results, I want to explain the results of the preparatory 
estimations. 
I tried to estimate the following potential candidates for the explanatory variables. (1) 
number of clinics and hospitals, (2) number of beds per population, (3) number of beds
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Table 1 (a) Estimation of the Health Care Costs per Case (1974-78) 
by OLS with Pooled Data
Footnote : t-values in parentheses. 
in hospitals with more 300 beds, (4) population of densely populated area/population (5). 
The reason why variables (1), (2) and (4) are candidates might be clear. Since cost 
per case might be higher in large hospitals than those in smaller hospitals, I picked it up 
as a variable.3) 
However, none of these variables increased the explanatory power of the results shown 
below. The physician-population ratio is the most dominant variable in explaining cost per 
case. Though variables (1) to (3) are positively correlated with the physician-population 
ratio, those are less powerful factors. 
Althogh, in what follows, I will interpret the results shown in Table 2. I will indicate 
one comment for the interpretation of the Table (1). The reason why I showed Table 1 
is that there is a doubt whether this estimation is suitable in taking account the serial 
correlation for only short period like 5 years. The results shown in Table 1 is quite similar 
with those in Table 2. Therefore, regardless of the way of estimation, following interpre-
tations are robust in this sense. 
 3) See, for instance, Okinaka Research Institute [1980] .
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Table 1(b) Estimation of the Health Care Costs per Case (1979-83) 
by OLS with Pooled Data
 Footnote : t-values in parentheses. 
A priori sign conditions are almost satisfied in Table 2, except that some coefficients 
on the ratio of the copayment. This might be because regional variation of the ratio of 
the copayment is not so significant at all. 
At first, the null hypothesis that physician-population ratio is zero is rejected at 1 per 
cent level at any estimation. This indicates that the competitive market hypothesis is not 
accepted. 
We can raise several side-evidences on the plausibility of the physician-induced demand 
hypothesis in Japan. Here I show some of them. Most of patients do not try to get 
information on the health care at the clinic or at the hospital. A study by some consumer 
activists shows that more than 70 per cent of the patient who visited the hospital did not 
ask the name of drugs prescribed at the clinic or the hospital. 
Recently, some of European countiries and the United States are trying to make 
technology assessments on health care in order to inform people of the way choose to 
alternative health cares. However, in Japan, these assessements are not being done. The 
reason why the necessity of these assessements are not recognized in Japan is that 
patients are more dependent on physicians, that is patient-physician relationship is quite
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Table 1(c) Estimation of the Health Care Costs per Case (1974-83) 
by OLS with Pooled Data
 Footnote : t-values in parentheses. 
different in Japan. 
This patient dependency on physician will also support the physician-induced demand 
hypothesis in Japan. 
At the same time, many physicians who have ever practised in the United States, 
witness that Japanese patients more highly rely than those in the United States on the 
diagnosis and the treatment without questioning the implication of them. 
Regional variation of the cost per case is persistent at least during past two decades. 
Though the mobility of patients between different areas are gradually smoothing, high 
correlation between cost per case and the physician-population ratio has not changed. 
Secondly, I would like to investigate the relationship between the number of case per 
population (n) and the cost per case (p). If n and p are positively correlated, this implies 
that decreased number of patients will not raise the total cost of health care (p n). In 
other words, in this case, policies to reduce the number of patients may be effective in 
reducing the cost of health care. 
However, the results show that, except for the case of the elderly patients, these 
policies will not effective. Since results shown in Table 2 are expressed in logarithmistic
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Table 2(a) Estimation of the Health Care Costs per Case (1974-78) 
by Considering the Serial Correlation
Footnote : t-values in parentheses. 
Table 2 (b) Estimation of the Health Care Cost per Case (1979-83) 
by Considering the Serial Correlation
Footnote : t-values in parentheses.
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Table 2(c) Estimation of the Health Care Costs per Case (1974-83) 
by Considering the Serial Correlation
Footnote : t-values in parentheses. 
term, coefficient on the number of case per population implies the fee elastisity of the 
demand. The value of this coefficient ranges from -0.269 to 0.053. -0.269 means that 
one per cent decrease of the number of cases rusults 0.269 per cent increase of the cost 
per case. In this sense, policies to reduce the number of patient visit has compensated 
by the clinic or the hospital to some extent. 
V Concluding Remarks 
Researches on the determination on the cost of health care in Japan in still less 
developed than in other developed countries. It is mainly due to the limits of data availa-
bility. Moreover, although this stuty done in this paper is interesting as the epidemiological 
studies, those are also far less developed. 
Anecdotally, physicians realize that significant regional variations are due to the physi-
cian-induced demand nature of their practices. Though government officials are suggesting 
that regional variations are not favorable from the view point of equity among regions, 
physicians are objecting to this viewpoint. Because medical practice has results in the 
different costs by its nature. 
In this paper, I have shown that regional variations have been persistent during at 
least ten years. This means, on one hand, professional uncertainty is not the main cause 
of the regional variations.4) On the other hand, it means that physicians do not move 
 4) The term 'professional uncertainty' should be referred to Wennburg [1983].
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to more profitable areas from more dispersed area. Though I believe that I could show 
that physician-induced demand hypothesis is pursuasive in Japan, mystery of the regional 
variation is not still resolved. 
There are so many thing to be done by the collaboration with epidemiologists and 
economists. I hope this paper to be just a first step to this collaboration. 
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